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CASE BRIEFS
AGENCY
Hospital Vicariously Liable For Physician's Malpractice Only
When Patient Reasonably Looked to Hospital for Treatment or
When Patient Viewed Hospital as Location For Treatment
The Court of Appeals of Michigan held there was no basis to hold
hospital defendants liable merely because patient relied on their
perception of their qualifications, their belief their physician was an
agent of the hospital, or their belief in obtaining services from the
physician.
Plaintiff Virginia VanStelle took plaintiff Robert P. VanStelle
2to the emergency room at co-defendant Bon Secours Hospital. The
hospital discharge papers showed the patient was referred to co-
defendant Dr. Thomas U. 3 Dr. U was an employee of co-defendant
Michigan Neurological Associates, P.C., and had staff privileges at
a few area hospitals - including St. John Hospital and St. John
Riverview Hospital.4 Patient went to Riverview Medical Offices to
see Dr U, wherein Dr. U diagnosed patient as having had a small
vessel lacunas stroke and hypertension and gave patient his card,
which listed "St. John Health System" and "Riverview Medical
Offices." 5 Soon after, patient suffered a stroke. 6 Patient instituted
this medical malpractice suit and alleged Dr. U was "an agent,
whether real or ostensible, servant and/or employee of defendants,
Michigan Neurology Associates, P.C.; St. John's Hospital and
Medical Center; St. John Health Systems; and St. John Health
Systems Detroit Medical Campus."
7
' Vanstelle et aL. v. Macaskill et al., No. 229123, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS
43, at *23 (Jan. 14, 2003).
2 Id. at *3.
3id.
4 Id.
' Id.
6 Vanstelle, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS at *4.
7 Id.
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The court considered whether a hospital could be held
vicariously liable for treatment at a medical professional building
"affiliated" with the hospital. 8 In addition, whether a hospital could
be held vicariously liable for medical treatment rendered by a
physician who represented himself as the hospital's physician for
treatment not provided at the hospital.9 The court identified three
elements necessary to establish an allegation of ostensible agency:
(1) the person dealing with the agent must do so with a reasonable
belief in the agent's authority, (2) the belief must be generated by
some act or neglect of the principal sought to be charged, and, (3)
the person relying on the agent's authority must not be guilty of
negligence. 10
The court found the Riverview defendants made no
representations that would lead patient to reasonably believe Dr. U
was an agent of St. John Riverview Hospital.'' Also, there was no
evidence linking St. John Riverview Hospital or the Riverview
Medical Offices with patient's selection of Dr. U because patient
only went to Dr. U after his own inquiry as to whether he was a "St.
John doctor." 12 The court said a critical factor was whether patient
looked to the hospital for treatment or whether patient "merely
viewed the hospital as the situs where the doctor would treat him,"
and found the hospital did not make any representations Dr. U was
acting on behalf of Riverview Hospital. As for the St. John
defendants, the court reviewed whether patient looked to St. John
for treatment and found St. John did not provide patient with Dr.
U's information, in the alternative, the emergency room physician at
Bon Secours Hospital provided patient with Dr. U's information.1
4
Therefore, the court held no reasonable person would believe Dr. U
was acting as an agent of the St. John defendants when providing
services for patient; the judgment of the trial court was reversed,
and the case was remanded to the trial court for entry of an order
granting summary disposition to the hospitals. 15 Vanstelle et al. v.
Macaskill et al. No. 229123, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 43 (Jan. 14
2003).
id.
Sld. at *7.
'
0 d. at * 11.
H Vanstelle, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS at *16.
12 Id. at * 17.
13 Id. at *19.
14 Id. at *22-23.
" Id. at *23-24.
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COPYRIGHT LAW
Filing of a Patent Application Prior to Patent Expiration Is Not
an Act of Infringement Unless the Application Seeks Approval
to Manufacture, Use, or Sell the Drug Prior to the Expiration of
a Patent.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois did not err in holding competitors did not infringe in seeking
approval to market their drug for use as an epilepsy treatment
because neither the drug or its stated use was covered by an existing
patent. 1O
Appellant, Warner-Lambert, sold a drug, gabapentin under an
expired patent for use in the treatment of partial seizures. 17
Appellee competitor Apotex, filed an Abbreviated New Drug
Application ("ANDA"), seeking approval to market a generic form
of gabapentin upon the expiration of Warner-Lambert's patent.'
8
Apotex declared that its proposed manufacture, use, and sale of the
drug would be limited solely to epilepsy treatment and its marketing
would not conflict with Warner-Lambert's use of its patent; namely,
Apotex would not include any indication for use in the treatment of
neurodegenerative of neurogenerative disease.' 9 Warner-Lambert
commenced a patent infringement action, contending that patients
would use Apotex's gabapentin for all purposes for which Warner-
Lambert's product is used, and doctors would prescribe the Apotex
product for such uses, including the treatment of neurodegenerative
diseases.
20
The court reviewed the district court's grant of summary
judgment de novo, interpreting the language of the patent statute at
issue. 2 1 When interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely
to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will
consider the language in connection with the whole statute. 22 As a
result, the court found that the statute does not make the filing of an
ANDA prior to patent expiration an act of infringement unless the
application sought approval to manufacture, use, or sell the drug
"' Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 594 at
**48. (U.S. Jan 16, 2003).
17 Id. at **4.
8 Id.
19 Id. at **5.
2 Id. at **7.
21 Warner-Lambert Co., 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 594 at **9.
2'2 Id. at **13.
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prior to expiration of a patent. 23 The court concluded that because
Apotex had not submitted an application to sell a drug for treatment
of neurodegenerative diseases, which is the only use covered by the
patent involved, Apotex was entitled to summary judgment of non-
infringement.
24
The court next addressed the question of whether Warner-
Lambert demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact with respect to inducement. 25 The court concluded that mere
knowledge of possible infringement by others does not amount to
inducement; specific intent and action to induce infringement must
be proven. 26 As Warner-Lambert failed to produce any evidence
Apotex possessed or would encourage doctors to infringe its patent,
there has been no genuine issue of material fact raised.
2 /
The court agreed with the district court's granting of summary
judgment in favor of Apotex., as the statute's language indicates
that Apotex did not infringe on an existing patent, and induced
neither patients nor doctors into infringing acts. Therefore, the
court affirmed the grant of non-infringement for Apotex. 28 Warner-
Lam bert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 594 (Jan. 16,
2003).
CRIME
Individual Is Guilty of Manslaughter When He Demonstrated
Reckless Behavior by Driving Contrary to Medical Orders and
Driving with the Knowledge That He Is Prone to Seizures
The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the District Court's
judgment convicting appellant of manslaughter. 29  There was
sufficient evidence to show that appellant was reckless and caused
the death of the victim by driving despite physician's orders not to
drive because he is prone to seizures.
30
Appellant Robertson suffered a grand mal seizure while
driving in his car, causing the car to run off the highway and
ultimately into the living room of a house, where a nine year old girl
2' Id. at *'15.
24 Id. at **36.
2' Id. at **37.
26 Warner-Lambert Co., 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 594 at **42.
27 Id. at **41.
28 Id. at **1.
29 Robertson v. State of Texas, No. 08-00-00147-CR, 2003 Tcx. App.
LEXIS 931 at *I (Jan. 30, 2003).
30 Id. at *20-21.
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was killed.3' Robertson was subsequently convicted of
manslaughter and sentenced to 15 years in prison by a jury. 32
Previously, Robertson had suffered a severe head injury from a
motorcycle accident, after which he became prone to seizures. 33 He
had since experienced other episodes of seizures, one of which was
while driving, and subsequently required anti-seizure medication.
34
The physician prescribing the medication ordered Robertson not to
drive, operate dangerous equipment, and to see a neurologist.
35
Robertson did not see a neurologist and stopped taking the anti-
seizure medications, despite physicians' orders to continue the
medication.
36
The issue addressed by the court was whether there was
sufficient evidence to prove Robertson had recklessly caused the
girl's death by: (1) not taking anti-seizure medications as ordered,
(2) driving against the orders of the physician, and (3) driving with
the knowledge that he was prone to seizures. 37 With respect to the
first factor, the court found that Robertson's failure to take the
medication was not intentionally done in disregard of the risks
associated with it, since he had seen numerous physicians, some or
all of who did not strongly enforce the necessity for the
medication. 38 The court held, however, that Robertson was liable in
the other two factors, given his past history of automobile accidents
while suffering seizures and evidence that he may have not
disclosed the truth about his medical condition on his driver's
license application. 39 These facts reflect evidence that Robertson
was acting in conscious disregard of the danger he would pose to
others. 40  His conviction was therefore affirmed.41 Robertson v.
State of Texas, No. 08-00-00147-CR, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 931
(Jan. 30, 2003).
"' Id. at *1.
32 Id. at *1.
" Id. at *3.
34 Robertson, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 931 at *4.
" Id. at *4-5.
36 Id. at *5.
37 Id. at *15-16.
31 Id. at * 16-20.
39 Robertson, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 931 at *20-21.
40 Id. at *21.
41 Id. at *21.
2003]
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DEFAMATION
A False Claim That a Physician Is Dying Harms a Physician by
Implying That S/he Lacks a Necessary Professional
Characteristic.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts held a physician who has
been falsely accused of having a terminal illness can recover
damages under defamation laws, without having to prove specific
economic loss.
42
Both Ravnikar and Bogojavlensky were physicians of
obstetrics and gynecology. 43 Ravnikar ("plaintiff") was diagnosed
with breast cancer in 1995 and treated successfully. 44 Two years
later, Bogojavlensky ("defendant") was approached by a patient
who was interested in finding a new gynecologist, and mentioned
hat she was also going to visit plaintiff.45 In response, defendant
46said plaintiff suffered from terminal breast cancer. When the
patient repeated these comments, plaintiff sued, alleging
defamation, intentional interference with business relations,
invasion of privacy and unfair competition. 47 After the district
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiff appealed to the appellate division, which affirmed the
lower court's decision.48 The Supreme Court subsequently reviewed
the case and concluded that summary judgment was improperly
entered on both the defamation and invasion of privacy claims. 49
The issue was whether plaintiff met the burden of proof
necessary to overcome a motion for summary judgment. To
withstand summary judgment, plaintiff must prove four elements of
defamation. 51 First, the defendant must have made a comment about
the plaintiff to a third party. 52 Second, the statement could damage
plaintiffs reputation and third, the defendant was at fault.53 Lastly,
42 Ravnikar v. Bogojavlensky, SJC-08820, 2003 Mass. LEXIS 114 at ***3
(Dec. 3, 2003).
43 Id at ***1.
44 Id.
45 Im.
46 Id.
47 Ravnikar, 2003 Mass. LEXIS 114.
' Id at I.
49 Id at 1-2.
50 Id at ***2.
51 Id at ***2.
52 Ravmikar, 2003 Mass. LEXIS 114 at ***2.
53 Id. at ***2.
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the statement either caused plaintiff economic loss or falls within
one of the exceptions of this requirement. 54 Four types of statements
are actionable without proof of economic loss including libel, those
that charge plaintiff with a crime, alleging plaintiff has certain
diseases and those that prejudice a person's business or
profession.
55
The court held plaintiff falls within the exception that allows
economic damages when statements prejudice a profession or
business. 56 By falsely informing a patient that plaintiff was
terminally ill, the defendant prejudiced her business or profession
by implying she lacked a necessary characteristic of the
profession. 57 Such a statement assumes that a physician cannot
maintain a caring, long-standing relationship with patients. 58
Therefore, the court vacated and remanded the lower court's
decision, concluding that defendant's action was actionable without
having to prove specific economic damage.59 Ravnikar v.
Bogojavlensky, 2003 Mass. LEXIS 114 (Dec. 3, 2003).
DISABILITY
State Law Claims For Disability Benefits Are Preempted by
ERISA When An Insurance Policy Falls within ERISA's Safe
Harbor Provision and Plaintiff Is a Participant or Beneficiary
of ERISA.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, granted a motion to dismiss in favor of Liberty
Life Assurance Company, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), on
all counts of emotional distress, retroactive benefits and punitive
damages because plaintiffs claims are state law claims that are pre-
empted bY the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA).
While Bernard Tumoy was employed as an independent agent
on behalf of the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, he
received short and long-term disability coverage through a Liberty
5" Id. at ***2.
55 id.
56 id at ***3.
57 Ravnikar, 2003 Mass. LEXIS 114 at ***3.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Bernard Turnoy v. Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston, No. 02 C
6066, 2003 US. Dist. LEXIS 1311 at *1 (N.D. III. Jan. 30, 2003).
2003]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
group policy. 6 1 In December 2000, plaintiffs health began to
deteriorate to such an extent that he sought disability benefits from
Liberty. 62 After his petition was denied on February 5, 2002, the
plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed the decision.63 Plaintiff alleged
that Liberty failed to respond to his appeal and that he was owed
benefits in the amount of $4255.90/month since March 17, 2001.
He also sued for tort damages of emotional distress and punitive
damages for "unreasonable conduct." 64 In its motion to dismiss,
Liberty asserts plaintiffs insurance policy is an ERISA "employee
welfare benefit plan" thereby preempting any state claims.
65
Furthermore, his claims for emotional distress and punitive
damages must also be stricken. 66
The Seventh Circuit has construed 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), which
defines "employee welfare benefit plans," to include five elements.
These are: (1) a plan, fund, or program, (2) established or
maintained, (3) by an employer, and (5) top participants or their
beneficiaries. Moreover, ERISA's safe harbor regulation states
that an employee welfare benefit plan does not include certain
provisions outlined in 29 C.F.R. §2510.3-1 0). 68
The first issue the court addresses is whether Mass Mutual's
policy was "established and maintained" in such a way that it fell
outside of ERISA's safe harbor provision. 69 For a plan to remain
outside the provision, employer neutrality must be established. 70 In
this case, Mass Mutual was not neutral because Mass Mutual was
extensively involved in the establishment and maintenance of the
policy. 71 For example, the policy states Mass Mutual is the
"sponsor," eligible classes of insurance benefits will be published
annually by the company, and all premiums are payable to Mass
Mutual. 72 Therefore, Mass Mutual's policy falls outside the safe
harbor policy and ERISA is implicated. The second issue is
whether plaintiff can properly be classified as a beneficiary covered
61 Id at *2.
62 Id.
63 1d.
64 Id. at *2.
65 Turnoy, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1311 at *2.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id at *2-3.
69 [1. *3.
70 Turnoy, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1311 at *3.
71Id.72 Id.
73 1(1.
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by ERISA when he was an independent contractor. 74 The court
held that the plaintiff was a beneficiary to whom ERISA provisions
apply, even if he is not an employee of Mass Mutual and a
participant of ERISA 75. Thus, an independent contractor may be
subject to ERISA's provisions.7 6
The third issue addressed by the court concerned whether
ERISA preempts plaintiffs' state law claims.77 The court concluded
plaintiffs claims of breach of contract, emotional distress and
unreasonable conduct relate to an ERISA plan, thus falling within
its preemption clause. 78 However, plaintiff maintains his claims fall
within the saving clause, 29 U.S.C. §1 144(b)(2)(A), which allows
persons to pursue claims under state laws notwithstanding their
relation to ERISA. 79 To determine whether saving clause applied,
the court had to ask whether the state law is directed to the
insurance industry. 8 ° Next, the court determined whether the law
regulates insurance by (1) transferring policy holder risk, (2) being
integral to a policy relationship and (3) limiting the entities of the
insurance industry. 81 The court held the saving clause does not
apply so plaintiffs claim is not preempted. 82  Since each of
plaintiffs claims was preempted by ERISA, the court granted
defendant's motion to dismiss all counts. Bernard Turnoy v. Liberty
Life Assurance Company of Boston, No. 02 C 6066, 2003 US. Dist.
LEXIS 1311 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2003).
Employer Improperly Discontinued Employee's Temporary
Total Disability Compensation without Evidence of Maximum
Medical Improvement and without Offering Alternative Work
The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth Appellate District, said a
magistrate's determination was correct in holding defendants'
findings that an employer improperly discontinued temporary total
disability payments to respondent employee, were proper. 83 There
was sufficient evidence by respondent worker's physician and the
74 Id.
75 Turnoy, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1311 at *4.
76 id.
77 Id at *5,
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Turnoy, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1311 at *5.
81 id.
12 Id at *5.
83 Nestle USA v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, No. OIAP-1214, 2003 Ohio
413, *P7-*P8.
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fact employer did not provide other work to her to show that relator
improperly discontinued payments.
8 4
Respondent worker Karen S. Chesnick ("Chesnick") filed a
claim regarding an injury sustained during employment with relator
Nestle USA ("Nestle"). 85 After Nestle refused to certify the claim,
a district hearing officer allowed the claim and gave temporary total
disability (TTD) compensation to Chesnick. 86
The TTD compensation continued until Chesnick's physician
granted her permission to return to work but with restrictions for
light duty work only. 87  Nestle then sent a letter to Chesnick,
acknowledging the findings by physicians that required her to
perform only light work. It also stated that Nestle did not have any
light duty work available and therefore they must discharge
Chesnick. 89 Ten days later, Nestle sent another letter that stated that
Chesnick's TTD compensation will be discontinued. 90 Chesnick
filed a complaint against Nestle on the grounds that Nestle
improperly discharged her without a hearing and without a
statement by a physician informing them of maximum medical
improvement and/or permanency of injury.9 1 Respondent Self-
Insuring Employers Evaluation Board (SIEEB) found the complaint
valid.92 Nestle sought, among other requests, to vacate this finding
and maintain discontinued TTD benefits.
93
The main issue before the court was whether Nestle's
termination of Chesnick's TTD compensation was proper.94 The
court held Nestle did not have the authority to terminate
compensation since it did so in violation of the Ohio statute.95 The
statute states that a self-insured employer cannot terminate an
employee's TTD compensation unless one of several exceptions
exists. X Though Nestle claimed that one of these exceptions
occurred the court found otherwise and held that Nestle
misinterpreted the statute.97 Therefore, the court ruled for a writ of
84 Id. at *P5-*P7.
85 Id. at *P10.
'6 Id. at *Plo-*Pl 1.
" Id. at *P13-*P15.
88 Nestle, 2003 Ohio 413 at *P20.
99 Id. at *P21.
90 Id. at *P23.
91 Id. at *P24-*P25.
92 Id. at *P31.
93 Nestle, 2003 Ohio 413 at *PI.
94 Id. at *P69.
95 Id. at *P106.
46 Id. at *P99.
97 ld. at *PIOI-*P106.
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mandamus ordering TTD compensation to be awarded to Chesnick
based on the physician's reports. 98  Nestle USA v. Industrial
Comm 'n of Ohio, No. O1AP-1214, 2003 Ohio 413 (Jan. 30, 2003).
Administrative Law Judges Must Explain with Sufficient
Specificity and Substantial Evidence Its Decision to Discount an
Insurance Claimant's Treating Physician's Opinion about the
Claimant's Onset of Medical Conditions
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York held an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") who discounts an
insurance claimant's treating physician's opinion regarding the
onset of a medical condition must explain with sufficient specificity
and substantial evidence the basis for discounting the opinion. 9
9
Plaintiff had back surgery in 1981 to remove a herniated
disc.100 After the operation, plaintiff continued to experience pain
and limited mobility.' 0 ' She was admitted for hospital treatment
two times in 1982. 1 2 A subsequent hospital stay in 1985 led to a
diagnosis of sciatic radiculopathy and cervical radiculitus, both back
conditions. 0 3 Plaintiff Martinez began seeing Dr. Edgar Baraya in
1988. 1 4 Martinez's insurance terminated in March 1997.105 Dr.
Baraya's reports consistently explained that Martinez's back
conditions were after-effects of her 1981 back surgery. °6 Four
additional doctors subsequently examined Martinez. 1 7  Two
doctors to whom Martinez was referred by her treating physician
found that herpain and mobility restrictions derived from her 1981
back surgery. Two doctors to whom Martinez was referred by
the Social Security Administration found no back condition
originating from her 1981 surgery.109
Martinez underwent various MRI testing from 1989 to 1996
which reported some back disc deterioration and bulging, disc
9' Nestle, 2003 Ohio 413 at *P 116.
99 Martinez v. Massanari, 01 Civ. 2114, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1002, at *9,
24 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2003).
00 Id. at *3.
101 Id, at *4.
102 Id.
103 id.
104 Martinez, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1002 at *4.
105 id.
'06 Id. at *5.
07 Id. at *5-7.
Id. at *5-6.
109 Martinez, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1002 at *5-7.
20031
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protrusion, denervation, and loss of disc signal, all adverse back
conditions. 110 X-rays revealed arthritic changes and localized
sclerosis.''' Later MRIs taken between 1996 and 1998 and further
X-rays revealed similar degeneration.' 2 The Social Security Act
requires that a person claiming insurance benefit coverage for a
disability have been insured at the moment of the onset of the
disability. 113
The court addressed the standard of review which binds an
ALJ in his or her determination of an insuree's claim for disability
benefits. 114  The court held an ALJ must meet a "substantial
evidence" standard and apply a five-step evaluation of claims.''
5
The court defined "substantial evidence" as evidence a reasonable
person would consider adequate to prove a claim for benefits.'
16
The five-step process of evaluation of a claim includes identifying
whether the claimant is capable of gainful employment, has a severe
impairment, has the capacity to perform past work, and whether the
claimant could perform other work." 7 The court reasoned a judge
should give the treating physician's opinion substantial weight as
long as it is well-supported and consistent with other evidence
presented in the claimant's record.'' 8 Further, the ALJ should
explain his or her decisions with sufficient specificity that discount
the treating physician's medical opinion or make conclusions about
an administrative record that contains unresolved ambiguities or
inadequate clarifications. '9
The court also addressed the weight a treating physician's
opinion should have when applied to retrospective diagnoses.1
20
The court held a treating physician's opinion should control unless
other evidence in the record contradicts the opinion. The court
reasoned the treating physician is currently treating the claimant
despite the possibility that the treating physician may not have
treated the claimant during the insured period.12 1 Moreover, the
diagnosis of a claimant's medical condition may be made after the
1 1 Id. at *7-8.
... Id. at *8.
112 Id. at *9.
'13 Id. at *10.
114 Martinez, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1002 at *10.
115 Id. at *9-10.
6 Id.
117I d. at *1 I.
ii8 Id.
119 Martinez, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1002 at *13-14.
20 Id. at *16.
121 Id. at *19.
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actual moment of onset of the condition.' 22  The court also
reasoned, however, an ALJ may weigh the treating physician's
opinion against factors such as the length of the physician-claimant
relationship, the support of the physician's opinion by other medical
sources, and whether the treating physician is a specialist.
123
Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings was denied and
plaintiffs motion for remand for a new hearing was granted.
124
Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings was also
denied. 125 Martinez v. Massanari, 01 Civ. 2114, 2003 US. Dist.
LEXIS 1002 (S.D.N.Y Jan. 24, 2003).
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
The Court Did Not Find Employer to Have Violated the Family
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) When It Discharged Employee
after Granting More than Twelve Weeks of Leave.
The Court of Appeals of Colorado reviewed a trial court's decision
to grant summary judgment de novo. 126 Summary judgment is
appropriate only if the pleadings and documents illustrate no
genuine issue of material fact. 127 Here, the court affirmed the lower
court's summary judgment stating that the employer did not violate
the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) when it discharged
employee after granting more than twelve weeks of leave. 128
Plaintiff Krauss was a long-term employee of Catholic Health
Initiatives Mountain Region. She first took leave under FMLA in
1999 and then again in 2000 because of serious health problems.
129
When her twelve-week entitlement was used, her employer gave her
an extension, but terminated her employment when she failed to
request personal leave or return to work.' 30 Consequently, plaintiff
sued for denial or interference with her FMLA rights, constructive
discharge and public policy wrongful discharge.131
122 Id. at *17.
123Id.* 12.
124 Martinez, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1002 at *25.
5 d. at *25.
126 Krauss v. Catholic Health Initiatives Mountain Region, 02 CA 0108,
2003 Colo. App. LEXIS 124.
127 Id at *1.
128 Id.
29 /d.
130 Id.
131 id.
2003]
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Krauss maintained that disputed facts remain concerning
employer's violation of the FMLA. 132 The FMLA guarantees
employees twelve weeks leave each year and the reinstatement of
the employee to her former position once she has returned. 133 Under
29 U.S.C. §2614(a) (1), employees may sue for entitlement,
interference, retaliation or discrimination.134 The court held the
employer did not deprive plaintiff of FMLA rights by discharging
her while she was on leave. 135 To satisfy an entitlement claim,
plaintiff must prove employer interfered with, restrained or denied
her rights, and this denial resulted in prejudice. 136 In this case,
employee received written notice that her additional leave would
expire soon. 137 The letter specified that employee must return to
work or request personal leave. 138 This letter was followed by a
phone call and another letter but plaintiff never responded. '39 Since
employer discharged her after she had received more then twelve
weeks, the trial court did not err in finding the discharge lawful. 4 '
Second, employer did not interfere with FMLA rights when a
supervisor verbally reprimanded plaintiff for absences. 14 1 With
respect to this and other allegations, employee did not show
prejudice since she received more than twelve weeks of FMLA
leave regardless. 142 Third, plaintiff did not establish a prima facie
case of retaliation. 1
43
To establish such a case, an employee must show assertion of
FMLA right, followed by an adverse employment action and their
causal connection. 144 Adverse employment action means a final
decision regarding hiring, firing, compensation, benefits or the
failure to promote or grant leave. 145 The court did not find
plaintiff's denial of Christmas vacation time or her termination to be
adverse employment action. 146 Fourth, employer did not violate the
132 Krauss, 2003 Colo. App. LEXIS 124 at *1.
133 id.
'4 Id. at *2.
135 Id.
136 Id. at *2.
137 Krauss, 2003 Colo. App. LEXIS 124 at *2.
131 Id. at *2.
139 Id.at *2.
140 Id. at *2.
141 Id.
142 Krauss, 2003 Colo. App. LEXIS 124 at *3.
143 id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at *3-4.
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FMLA by constructively discharging her. 147  To establish
constructive discharge, employee must present enough evidence to
show employer deliberately made working conditions so intolerable
that a reasonable person would be forced to resign. 148 Here, since
plaintiff was an at-will employee, subject to discharge at any time,
she must combine her constructive discharge claim with a right to
continued employment.149 Lastly, the court does not find a public
policy wrongful discharge. 150 Therefore, the trial court did not err
in granting summary judgment on employee's FMLA claims. 15 1
Krauss v. Catholic Health Initiatives Mountain Region, No.
02CA 0108, 2003 Colo. App. LEXIS 124 (Jan. 30, 2003).
Terminating an Employee While the Employee Is Awaiting
Disability and Employee Benefits Does Not Constitute
Conspiracy or Breach of Contract Unless the Employer Acted
Overtly and Purposely in Terminating the Employee While
Benefits Were Pending
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York held an employer may terminate an employee while the
employee is awaiting disability and employee benefits as long as the
employer is not overtly acting to prevent the receipt of benefits and
the loss of benefits is a "mere consequence" of the termination.' 52
Plaintiff Enrique Caraveo began employment as a recruiter
with Nielson Media Research, Inc. in December 1988.153 In July
1998 and March 1999, Caraveo suffered a stroke and the onset of
legal blindness in his left eye. 154 Due to these conditions, Caraveo
was unable to fully perform the duties of his position, which
entailed travelling cross-country and computer data processing.
155
Caraveo notified his employer of his vision problems and requested
reassignment to a position that did not require continuous driving. 156
Nielsen removed Caraveo from its payroll and Caraveo applied for
and began receiving disability benefits from Metropolitan Life
147 Krauss, 2003 Colo. App. LEXIS 124 at *4.
141 Id. at *4.
141 Id. at *4.
50 Id. at *5.
SI Id. at *5.
152 Caraveo v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 01 Civ. 9609, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 941, at *12-13, 17 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2003).
'I3 id. at *3.
155 id.
156 Id. at *4.
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Insurance, Inc. ("MetLife"). 57 Nielsen granted Caraveo short-term
disability benefits upon Caraveo's request, while he sought a
different job more compatible with his medical restrictions.' 58
MetLife ended Caraveo's disability coverage on April 19, 2000.159
Caraveo's renewed request for a transfer to a different position
with Nielsen was finally granted on May 5, 2000.160 Caraveo
relocated to New Jersey to begin work on May 27, 2000.161
However, thereafter Nielsen terminated Caraveo's employment.
162
Subsequently, Caraveo filed a complaint against Nielsen with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").163
Caraveo made several attempts to obtain documents from Nielsen
relevant to his complaint, but was repeatedly unsuccessful. 164
Although Caraveo explained to the EEOC that his requests for
documents from Nielsen were being denied, the EEOC dismissed
Caraveo's claims on July 20, 2001.165 Caraveo then filed suit in
federal court against Nielsen alleging civil conspiracy and that his
employer violated the Employee Retirement Security Income Act
("ERISA") by terminating his employment with the intention of
interfering with his pending claims for benefits. 1
66
The first issue before the court was whether Nielsen conspired
against Caraveo to violate state human rights laws and to deny
Caraveo employment and benefits because of his disability. 167 The
court held that an employer could only have civilly conspired
against an employee if it had overtly and intentionally acted in
furtherance of a corrupt agreement which caused damage to the
employee.16  The court reasoned civil conspiracy required a
meeting of the minds of the parties and evidence of overt acts of
conspiracy to deny an employee employment and disability
benefits. 169
The second issue the court considered was whether an ERISA
action exists when (a) an employee is fired contemporaneously with
151 Caraveo, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 941 at *4.
158 /d1 59 ld.
60 Id.
01 id. at *5.
6 2 Caraveo, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 941 at *5.
163 Id.
164 Id. at *5-6.
165 Id at *6.
166 id.
167 Caraveo, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 941 at * 12-13.
168 Id. at *10.
169/d. at *12-13.
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pending appeals for benefits and (b) the employer refuses employee
requests for documents. 70 The court held an employer does not
violate ERISA when an employee's loss of pension benefits is a
"mere consequence" of the end of his/her employment.171  In
relation to beneficiary documents, the court held an employer
cannot be held liable for refusing to supply beneficiary documents
to an employee when the employee displays knowledge that another
entity was its benefit plan administrator. 172 The court also reasoned
the American Disabilities Association ("ADA") regulations did not
apply to employers who offer employees insurance through a third-
party company. 173 The court further reasoned that, in order for a
valid claim for a violation against the EEOC to exist, the employee
must have requested documents from the EEOC in compliance with
its document request policies.174 Plaintiff's claims were dismissed
except for Count 18, which alleged that respondent employer did
not obtain plaintiffs written consent prior to disclosing plaintiff
employee's information to a third party.175 Defendant's motion to
dismiss was otherwise granted. 176  Caraveo v. Nielsen Media
Research, Inc., 01 Civ. 9609, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 941 (S.D.N. Y.
Jan. 22, 2003).
The United States Government Can Invoke an Independent
Contractor Exception to Preserve Sovereign Immunity Against
Legal Claims If It Does Not Explicitly Control or Supervise the
Performance of Its Contractors
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held the independent contractor exception to tort
claims against the United States may be invoked if the government
does not explicitly supervise the daily operations and activities of its
contractors. 177
Thomas Threadgill resided and worked at Potomac Job Corps
Center in Washington, D.C. 17 8 The United States Department of
Labor runs The Job Corps program which provides training for at-
"0 Id. at *17-18.
171 Id. at *17.
712 Caraveo, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 941 at *19.
11 Id. at *26.
174 Id. at *37.
"' Id. at *38.
76 Id.
177 Young v. United States, No. 01-5484 and 02-3611, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1341 at *18-19 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2003).
178 id. at * 1.
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risk young adults aged 16-24 years of age.' 79  Threadgill died
following an altercation with another Job Corps resident on the
Center grounds. 180 Threadgill's father (plaintiff) initiated lawsuits
against the United States government and Management and
Training Corporation ("MTC"), the contractor that runs the
Potomac Center. 181 Plaintiff alleged that neglect to provide adequate
security, supervision, and proper maintenance of common areas in a
federal facility proximately caused his son's death.182 Plaintiff also
argued the government should be estopped from claiming an
independent contractor exception as the Job Corps program is
government-sponsored. 1
8 3
The federal government may not be sued under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.'8 4 The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA")
waives the United States from claiming liability against certain tort
claims. 185 However, the FTCA waiver does not include torts by
employees of contractors hired by the government, deemed the
"independent contractor" exception. 86
The court addressed whether the United States government
was responsible for actions of its independent contractors in
maintaining common areas, security, and supervision for programs
sponsored by the United States. 187 The court held the government
may assert an independent contractor exception and establish
immunity to legal claims unless the government directly supervises
the daily operations and actions of its contractors. 188 The court
reasoned government responsibility for negligence of contractors is
explicitly and purposely limited by the contract, such as the
government delineating its duties separately from those of the
contractor.
189
The court continued by holding contracts in which the
government specifically reserves for itself a daily role in the
activities of the contractor would not allow the government to
invoke the independent contractor exception. However, the absence
of specific language prohibiting the government from exercising
179 Id.
180)
... Id. at *2.
82 Young, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1341 at *3.
183 Id. at *6.
184 Id. at *5.
185 Id.
18, Id.
187 Young, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1341 at *5.
[88 Id. at *10.
189 Id. at *18.
[Vol. 6:357
CASE BRIEFS
supervision over the contractor's activities does not automatically
exclude the government from invoking the independent contractor
exception.19° Plaintiff's complaints against the United States were
dismissed.' 9 ' The United States' motion to dismiss was granted.
192
Plaintiffs separate action against MTC is not affected by the
dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint against the United States., 93 The
United States' motion for a stay was denied. 94 Young v. United
States, No. 01-5484 and 02-3611, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 7, 2003).
EVIDENCE
Enzyme Analysis Used to Test Blood Alcohol Level Meets Frye
Test as a Matter of Law
The Supreme Court of Kansas reversed a finding by the district
court that an enzyme analysis testing procedure did not meet the
requirements of the Frye test, and remanded the case to the lower
court with the finding that the results of the enzyme analysis test
were admissible. 19
5
Wayne Graham ("Graham") was found guilty of driving under
the influence of alcohol, and in his appeal to the district court, he
filed a motion to suppress results of the blood alcohol test
administered to him the night of his arrest.' 96 The state's expert
testified that the enzyme analysis used in the blood test was
commonly used in hospitals and labs, and that the test results
produced by the machine were generally accepted both by the
hospital laboratory community and by physicians in treating
patients. 97 Graham's expert, however, testified that he did not
agree that the enzyme analysis test was "generally accepted in
courts of law for the purposes of ascertaining blood alcohol
content" in criminal cases, and that the high percent of error rate
rendered it unreliable. 
198
190 Id. at *21.
'' Id. at *23.
92 Young, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1341 at *22.
113 Id. at *23.
' Id. at *19.
195 Kansas v. Graham, No. 88,881 2003 Kan. LEXIS 13 at *20 (Jan. 24,
2003).
196 Id. at *3-4.
" Id. at *6.
t' Id. at *7-8.
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The Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether the
enzyme analysis test met the standards of the Frye test. 199 Because
the standard of review for a trial court's application of the Frye
standard is de novo, the court rejected Graham's argument that the
court should be reluctant to take judicial notice of a scientific test
under Frye where the district court has excluded the evidence.
20 0
The court held the enzyme analysis satisfied Frye, reasoning that a
number of other states have accepted such evidence, it was not a
novel method for determining blood alcohol concentration, and both
experts testified that the test was commonly used in hospitals.
20
'
Therefore, the court reversed and remanded to include the
evidence.202 Kansas v. Graham, No. 88,881 2003 Kan. LEXIS 13
(Jan. 24, 2003).
Trial Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error When It Allowed
Defendant, Negligent Driver, to Tell Jury He Was Unemployed
Due to His Multiple Sclerosis.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the trial court did not
commit reversible error when it allowed defendant to tell the jury
that the reason for his unemployment was due to multiple sclerosis,
since it was evident to both the trial court and the jury that
defendant suffered from this serious ailment. 2 3 This was a hearing
to determine fair compensation for the plaintiff due to the admitted
negligence of defendant in a car accident.
204
An automobile driven by defendant, Babel, pulled in front of a
car driven by plaintiff, Hodge, causing the two cars to collide.
205
Hodge suffered a cut and other injuries, but was released from the
hospital the night of the accident.206  Ms. Hodge brought a
negligence action against Babel in which Babel conceded his
207negligence had caused the accident. Consequently, the issue of
damages was submitted to the jury in the following form: "What
damages would fairly compensate Ms. Hodge for the injuries that
199 Id. at *9.
2 00Kansas, 2003 Kan. LEXIS 13, at *12.
2"' Id. at * 19-20.
202 Id. at * I.
203 Hodge v. Babel, No. 1930, 2003 Md. App. LEXIS 6 at *19 (Jan. 30,
2003).
204 Id.
205 Id. at * 1.
206 m.
207 Id.
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she sustained in the . . . accident?, 20 8 Babel testified on his behalf
that he was unemployed because he suffered from "progressive
multiple sclerosis." 20 9 Plaintiffs objected to this question on the
ground that the information was irrelevant and it would otherwise
disorient the jury. 21  However, the judge overruled the objection
and gave a special instruction for the jury not to consider "sympathy
for any party." 21 I The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff in the amount of $2,600 even though plaintiff had
introduced evidenced showing damages in the amount of
21221$15,167.44. Subsequently, plaintiff appealed.213
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court committed
reversible error where it allowed defendant to tell the jury that he
was unemployed due to his condition of multiple sclerosis. 2 14 The
court held the trial court did not commit error because testimony
215
stating that defendant was not employed was not prejudicial.
Consequently, the court found that testimony regarding defendant's
cause of unemployment was not prejudicial because it was
undisputed that the defendant walked with an unsteady gait and had
trouble rising from the counsel table. 216 Furthermore, it is not an
abuse of discretion for the trial judge to allow the witness, in this
case defendant, to give a brief explanation as to the cause of his
physical problem where if no explanation is given, the jury may
conclude that the disability caused the plaintiffs injury in
question.217 Hodge v. Babel, No. 1930, 2003 Md. App. LEXIS 6
(Jan. 30, 2003).
The Term "Community" is not an Entire State for Purposes of
Establishing the Standard of Care in a Negligence Action.
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee at Nashville upheld summary
judgment in favor of defendant physician in a negligence case
208 Hodge, 2003 Md. App. LEXIS 6 at * 1.
209 Id. at*2.
210 Id. at *19.
211 Id. at *21.
212 Id. at 2.
213 Hodge, 2003 Md. App. LEXIS 6 at 3.
214 Id.
215 Id. at *20.
216 id. at *18.
217 id.
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dealing with the standard of care of the community in which the
physician practices or in a similar community.21
8
The plaintiffs were husband and wife; the wife, Laura, sought
treatment by Dr. Thompson at his office in Nolensville, Tennessee
for pain in her upper back.219 While injecting steroid and pain
medication into the area of pain, Dr. Thompson inadvertently
pierced Laura's lung with a needle, causing a partially collapsed
lung. 22  Dr. Thompson informed her of the puncture and
immediately admitted her to Williamson County Medical Center for
observation and further x-rays. 22 1 After a re-expansion procedure,
Laura was discharged from the hospital, and after a follow-up visit
to Dr. Thompson it appeared that the injury had been resolved. 222
Plaintiffs filed suit one year later, alleging that Dr. Thompson was
negligent and did not conform to the standard of care of the
community in which he practiced or in a similar community as
required by the Tennessee "Locality Rule." 223  The affidavit
submitted by plaintiffs expert claimed that the standard of care in
Nolensville, Tennessee at the time Laura was injured was the same
standard of care in the state of Georgia, where the expert
224practiced.
The appellate court did not accept this argument, reasoning
that entire states are not be qualified as "communities," and because
the expert's testimony did not allege the factual background it
needed to establish what made the state of Georgia similar to the
community of Nolensville, Tennessee. 225 The court affirmed the
trial court decision that the plaintiffs' medical expert failed to
establish the requisite familiarity with the standard of care in the
community in which Dr. Thompson practices, or in a similar
community. 226 Totty v. Thompson, No. M2001-02539-COA-R3-CV,
2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS II (Jan. 8, 2003).
219 Totty v. Thompson, No. M2001-02539-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tcnn. App.
LEXIS II at *l(Jan. 8, 2003).
219 Id. at *2.
220 id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Totty, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS I1, at *4-5.
224 Id. at *6.
225 Id. at *14-15.
22, Id. at * 1.
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FDA AUTHORITY
The FDA Has Limited Authority to Create Regulations
Unrelated To Those Specifically Provided by the FDC Act.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held the
district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs complaint, which
challenged the Food and Drug Administration's ("FDA") mandate
regulating packaging of certain dietary supplements. 22  The issue
on appeal was whether the FDA is delegated authority by Congress
to regulate the packaging of dietary supplements.
228
Plaintiffs, Nutritional Heath Alliance ("NHA"), filed a
complaint seeking a declaration that the packaging restrictions were
invalid and also sought a permanent injunction preventing the FDA
from enforcing the regulation. 229 Plaintiff argues that Congress
transferred jurisdiction from the FDA to enforce such regulations,
and that the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) retained
such authority under the Consumer Product Safety Act. 230 The
FDA argued that they share concurrent authority with the CPSC to
develop and enforce poison prevention packaging. 23  The district
court agreed with the FDA, and found that the NHA did not provide
sufficient evidence that by forming the CPSC, Congress intended to
eliminate the FDA's ability to regulate product packaging. 232
The FDA issued the regulation in response to "acute iron
poisonings" in children under the age of six, where accidental
overdoses of iron-containing supplements were the apparent
cause.233 After petitions made to the FDA, they issued a final rule,
whereby "unit-dose packaging" must be used for drugs and dietary
supplements that contain thirty milligrams or more of iron per
dosage unit. 234 The FDA believed this packaging would limit the
number of pills a child could consume, and therefore reduce the
acute poisonings.235 In its regulation, the FDA also mentioned that
227 Nutritional Health Alliance v. Food and Drug Administration, et. al, No.
01-6011,2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 921 (2d Cir. Jan. 21, 2003).
221 Id. at *2.
229 ld.
230 Id. at *4.
2 3
1 Id.
232 Nutritional Health Alliance, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 921 at *5.
23 Id. at *7.
234 Id. at *8.
235 Id. at *9.
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these drugs and supplements must also comply with the CPSC
child-resistant packaging regulations, as well.
The primary issue before the court was whether the FDA was
acting under a Congress appointed authority by issuing the
packaging regulation. 237 When an administrative agency asserts
jurisdiction to regulate a subject matter, the court must employ the
Chevron analysis. 238 This analysis begins with asking if Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question in issue; if so, the inquiry
ends, and Congress' intent is upheld.239 When Congress has not
addressed the question, the court must respect the agency's
construction of the statute, if it is permissible.
240
The court looked to the FDC Act, wherein, the FDA is granted
broad authority to regulate food, drug, and dietary supplements to
guarantee consumer safety. 24 Thus, the general construction of the
Act could give the appearance that the regulation falls under
Congress appointed powers. 242 However, the court turned to the
specific construction of the Act, and found that the FDA's
interpretation of authority to regulate "adulterated" products was
incorrect. 243 The Act deems adulterated products as "a product
packed under unsanitary conditions whereby it may have become
-244
contaminated or may be rendered injurious to health." The
FDA's regulation does not deal with contaminated products; in fact,
245these products are not banned by the FDA as unsafe. The court
found that the Act unambiguously fails to address the FDA's
authority, and that the FDA failed to meet the two prongs of the
Chevron Test.2 4 6 Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the
case to the district court, to provide for the proper remedy.
247
Nutritional Health Alliance v. Food and Drug Administration, et.
al, No. 01-6011, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 921 (2d Cir. Jan. 21,
2003).
236 Id. at *10.
237 Nutritional Health Alliance, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 921at *11.
238 id.
239 Id at * 12.
240 ld.
241 id. at *13.
242 Nutritional Health Alliance, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 921at *16.
243 Id.
244 Id at *2 1.
245 Id.
246 Id at 33.
247 Nutritional Health Alliance, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 921at *33.
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IMMUNITY
Purchase of Professional Liability Insurance Does Not Waive
State Employee's Immunity, and Failure to Raise Issue at Trial
Bars Raising It on Appeal.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld a grant of summary
judgment in favor of a defendant physician involving a claim of
wrongful death arising out of allegedly substandard care received at
a state university hospital.248
Inda Lewis ("Lewis") was admitted to the University of
Mississippi Medical Center ("UMMC") for treatment of pain
related to sickle cell anemia and died the following day.2 49 Dr.
Skelton was the attending physician at the time Lewis was admitted
to UMMC. 25° An autopsy revealed elevated levels of Demerol and
Meperdine Metabolite in Lewis's blood.25  Corey, the plaintiff and
administrator of Lewis's estate, filed an action for wrongful death
against Dr. Skelton, alleging Dr. Skelton was not an employee of
UMMC, Lewis's death was a result of substandard care received
from Dr. Skelton, and UMMC was vicariously liable for all
negligent acts of its employees. 252 Dr. Skelton filed a motion for
summary judgment based on his immunity as a state employee, and
that motion was granted.
25 3
On appeal, the court was faced with three issues: (1) whether
the trial court erred in finding that Dr. Skelton was an employee of
UMMC and was acting within the scope of his employment, (2)
whether the trial court erred in finding that Lewis's estate was not
entitled to compensation from Dr. Skelton's medical malpractice
policy, and (3) whether it was unconstitutional to deny Lewis's
estate compensation from Dr. Skelton's medical malpractice
insurance. 254  The court held Dr. Skelton was an employee of
UMMC and therefore immune from all liability, he did not waive
that immunity by purchasing professional liability insurance, and
the constitutionality claim was procedurally barred.2 5
248 Corey v. Skelton, No. 00730, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 6, at * I (Jan. 9, 2003).
249 Id. at *2.
250 id.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Corey, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 6, at *3.
24 Id. at *4.
255 Id. at *13.
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With regard to the first issue, the court applied a five-part test
outlined in an earlier case256 to determine whether state-employed
physicians should be granted immunity.257 Because Dr. Skelton's
functions were supervisory, the state has a compelling interest in
maintaining an educational environment in training residents and
interns, UMMC maintains great control over its employees, and Dr.
Skelton did not receive direct payment from Lewis since she was a
Medicaid patient, the court affirmed on the issue of Dr. Skelton
being an employee of UMMC and thus immune from liability.2
58
For the second issue, the court stated that the fact that physicians
have personally acquired professional liability insurance is
irrelevant to the inquiry as to whether a state employee enjoys
immunity.259  Regarding the third issue, the court reiterated the
well-established rule that in order to raise an issue on appeal, it
must have been raised at trial.260 Therefore, the court affirmed the
trial court's ruling that Dr. Skelton was immune from liability, he
did not waive immunity, and the constitutionality claim was
261barred. Corey v. Skelton, No. 00730, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 6, at *1
(Jan. 9, 2003)
INSURANCE
Where Plaintiff Fails to Establish Accidental Death There is No
Cause of Action for Breach of Contract and Fair Dealing
Against an Insurance Company
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted summary judgment to defendant insurance
company. 262 Plaintiff's cause of action for breach of the insurance
contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
where the plaintiff failed to prove that her husband's death was an
accident, was denied.263
Plaintiff's husband, Mr. Robert Shar, purchased an Accidental
Death and Dismemberment Certificate of Insurance from the
251, Corey, citing Miller v. Meeks, 762 So.2d 302 (Miss. 2000).
257 Corey, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 6, at *6.
258 Id. at *7-9.
259 Id. at *10.260 Id. at *11.
,1 Id. at *13.
262 Schar v. Hartford Life Insurance Co., No. C 02-1073 JL, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1022 at *31 (N.D. Cal. January 23, 2003).
263 Id. at *31.
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defendant, Hartford, and designated his wife as the beneficiary. 264
The policy excluded from coverage "a loss resulting from sickness
or disease" or a "loss resulting from . . .medical or surgical
treatment of a sickness or disease. ' 265 The parties dispute the cause
of death of Mr. Shar. 266 Mr. Shar's wife contends it was from an
embolism resulting from surgery and Hartford believes it was from
either atrial fibrillation or an embolism caused from surgery for Mr.
Shar's arthritis. 267 Mr. Shar's doctor, indicated that the primary
cause of death was presumed cardiac arrest and the secondary or
contributory cause was pulmonary embolism with atrial fibrillation
as a possible contributing factor. 26 8 Defendant filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment that Plaintiff opposed on the ground that there
were genuine issues of material fact as to the cause of Mr. Shar's
death, whether it was an accident, and whether it was covered under
the insurance policy.
269
The first issue addressed by the court was whether Mr. Shar's
death was the result of a sickness or disease or what could arguably
be an accident. 27 Both parties accepted the Supreme Court of
California's working definition for the term accident as "a casualty -
- something out of the unusual course of events and which happens
suddenly and unexpectedly and without design of the person
injured.",27' The court held that if an embolism caused Mr. Shar's
death it was not an accident, nor an unforeseen external event, but a
sickness or disease not covered under his accidental death policy.
2 72
The court further held "nearly all deaths are unintended by the
insured, whether they are 'expected' is impractical to ascertain and
so is whether they happened outside the usual course of events." 273
The second issue was whether Hartford, defendant,
intentionally and explicitly waived its defense that it properly
denied coverage and Mr. Shar's death was not an accident. 274 The
court held that defendant's reliance on the sickness and disease
exclusion does not constitute the express waiver the law requires. 2
75
264 Id. at *2.
265 id.
26 Id. at *3.
267 Schar, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1022 at *3.
26 Id. at *9.
269 Id. at *11.
270 Id. at * 14.
271 Id. at *15-16.
272 Schar, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1022 at *25.
273 Id. at *24.
274 Id. at *26.
275 Id. at *30.
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The final issue was whether the court should grant defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment. 276 The court held that there was no
coverage under the policy for Mr. Shar's death, defendant's denial
of coverage was proper and not a breach of the insurance contract,
and defendant did not waive its entitlement to claim that Mr. Shar's
death was not caused by an accident under California law.
277
Consequently, the court granted summary judgment to defendant on
plaintiffs cause of action for breach of the insurance contract.
Schar v. Hartford Life hsurance Co., No. C 02-1073 L, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1022 at *31 (N.D. Cal. January 23, 2003).
The Opinion of Treating Physicians Should Be Given Deference
When ERISA Sponsored Insurance Companies Determine Long
Term Disability Benefits
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed
the district court decision granting summary judgment in favor of
defendant insurance company, where the plaintiff sued defendant
alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA), with regard to the denial of continued long
term-disability (LTD) benefits. 278
Plaintiff brought the lawsuit as a result of the defendant
insurance company's denial of continued LTD benefits. 279 Plaintiff
claimed that he was permanently disabled due to a degenerative disc
disease and osteoarthritis in his back.2  From October 1996
through August 1998, defendant paid plaintiff monthly disability
benefits. 28 ' However, the payments ceased because plaintiff's
policy included a "special conditions" provision limiting the LTD
benefits (related to conditions other than arthritis) for 24 months. 282
Defendant eventually agreed with plaintiff that the special
conditions provision did not apply to him, they justified their further
refusal to continue benefits based on the plaintiffs failure to satisfy
the "Occupation Test". 283 The "Occupation Test" is defined as a
276 Id. at *12-15.
'77 Schiar, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1022 at *31.
278 Darland v. Fortis Benefits Insurance, No. 01-5387, 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 937 (6th Cir. Jan. 22, 2003).
279 Id. at *3.
280 Id
281 Id.
2 d at 4.283 Dar/and, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 937 at *4.
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disability that prevents the beneficiary from performing the material
duties of his regular occupation.
284
Before analyzing the case on the merits, the court recognized
that the district court failed to acknowledge a conflict of interest.
28 5
Defendant's final disability determination was based upon "peer
review" panels which were selected by a group defendant contacted
to assess plaintiffs claim.286 Since defendant was plaintiffs plan
administrator, they had an incentive to contract with a peer review
company whose medical experts were motivated to deny plaintiffs
claim to benefits. 287 Thus, when analyzing if defendant abused its
discretion, this conflict of interest must be taken into account.
288
The court reviewed the evidence and in light of this conflict of
interest found the defendant's denial of benefits to plaintiff was
arbitrary and capricious. 289 The court believed defendant ignored
the findings of plaintiff's attending physicians, and deferred their
decision to their own peer review committees. 29  Defendants
argued that plaintiff was capable of performing his material tasks at
work, because he spent his days "reading, walking at home, and
watching t.v. 291 The court identified the relevant issue as whether
plaintiff's treating physicians' opinion should be entitled to greater
292weight than defendant's peer review panel. This "treating
physicians rule" applying to ERISA had not been adopted in the
Sixth Circuit, so the court looked to other Circuits for guidance.
293
The court ultimately decided that the treating physician rule should
apply to ERISA cases because it will increase the accuracy of
disability determinations because decisions not to grant benefits
must have substantial evidence on the record.
294
Finally, the court recognized that while defendant was
rejecting plaintiffs request for benefits, they asked him to apply for
benefits through the Social Security Administration (SSA). 2 The
SSA determined plaintiff was permanently disabled, and granted
214Id. at 10.
25 Id. at 21.
286 Id.
287 Id.
218 Darland, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 937 at *22.
289 Id.
290 Id. at *27.
291 Id,
22 Id.
293 Daland, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 937 at *27.
294 Id. at *29.
295 Id. at *24.
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him monthly disability checks. 29 6 Since the SSA's standard for
granting disability benefits is more stringent than defendant's, the
court found defendant's repeated denial of LTD benefits in error.297
Thus, the court reversed the district court decision. Darland v.
Fortis Benefits Isurance, No. 01-5387, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 937
(6th Cir. Jan. 22, 2003).
A Health Insurance Benefits Plan Does Not Discriminate on the
Basis of Sex When Male and Female Employees Afflicted By
Infertility Are Equally Disadvantaged by the Exclusion of
Surgical Impregnation Procedures.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
employer with respect to the employee's Title VII and Pregnancy
Discrimination Act ("PDA") claims. 298  The Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded in part for a determination of whether the
employer sufficiently pleaded the federal preemption under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA").299
Rochelle Saks was a member of her employer Franklin
Covey's health benefits plan, which provided coverage to full-time
employees. 30 0 Under the plan, an employee was entitled to benefits
for "medically necessary" procedures, which were defined as "any
service...required for the diagnosis or treatment of an active illness
or injury that is rendered by or under the direct supervision of the
attending physician." 30 1 Under the plan, employees could claim
benefits for infertility products and procedures, including oral
fertility drugs and surgical infertility treatments. 302 Saks, unable to
conceive, sought reimbursement for all the costs associated with her
infertility treatments, but was refused for the majority of the costs,
including the costs for intrauterine inseminations and injectable
fertility drugs.
30 3
Saks alleged that Franklin Covey breached its contractual
obligations and that the plan's exclusion for surgical impregnation
procedures violated her civil rights under Title VII of the Civil
296 id at *25.
297 id.
298 Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., No. 00-9598, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 549 at
*3 (2d Cir. Jan. 15, 2003).
299 Id.
300 Id. at *3.
301 Id.
302 Id. at* 4.
303 Saks, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 549 at*6.
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Rights Act of 1964, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and the New York Human Rights
Law. 304 The district court held that the lack of coverage for the
contested infertility procedures did not violate the federal statutes
and that Saks's state law claims were preempted by ERISA.3 °5
The court reviewed the district court's grant of summary judgment
de novo. 30 6 Although the court found that the district court applied
incorrect standards in analyzing both the PDA and Title VII sex-
discrimination claim, the court affirmed the district court's
summary judgment decision because the plan's exclusion of
surgical impregnation procedures does not fall within the purview
of the PDA, and because the plan is gender-neutral.3 °7
The court determined that the district court erred in applying the
equal access standard to the employee's Title VII claim. 3° 8 Citing
Gilbert, the court confirmed that the proper inquiry in reviewing a
sex discrimination challenge to a health benefits plan is whether
exclusion of benefits for those conditions results in a plan that
provides inferior coverage to one sex. 309 As for the PDA, the court
concluded that because the exclusion of surgical impregnation
procedures disadvantages infertile male and female employees
equally, the PDA does not cover Saks's claim. 310  The court
remanded Saks's ERISA question to the district court to determine
whether Franklin Covey's motion for summary judgment should be
construed as a motion to amend the answer. 311 Saks v. Franklin
Covey Co., No. 00-9598, 2003 US. App. LEXIS 549 (2nd Cir. Jan.
15, 2003).
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Medical Standard of Care Requires Experts Have Personal
Knowledge of Relevant Medical Community Because of
Variance of Practice Between States.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held a
physician was barred from offering expert testimony because he did
not have knowledge of "the recognized standard of acceptable
304 Id. at *2.
305 Id.
306 Id. at *8.
307 Id. at *10.
308 Saks, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 549 at *12.
309 Id. at * 13.
3111 Id. at *20.
"'' Id. at *34.
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professional practice in the profession and the specialty thereof'
that defendant practiced in the community at the time of the alleged
injury. 312
In 1996, patient traveled from Carbondale, Illinois to
Nashville, Tennessee to see co-defendant, Dr. G. William Davis. 313
Defendant performed surgery on patient's back in a Nashville
hospital and returned to the same hospital to have another physician
remove a stabilizing device. 3 14 Patient's condition worsened soon
after leaving the Nashville hospital.31 5  During the subsequent
negligence lawsuit, patient made it known Dr. Gornet would not be
a retained expert because he was a treating physician. 31 6 Defendant
successfully moved to exclude Dr. Gornet from testifying at trial
under Federal Rule of Evidence 104 unless patient made him
reasonably available for deposition. 31 7 However, patient attempted
to admit Dr. Gornet's testimony regardless of his lack of production
for deposition.
3 18
The issue was whether Dr. Gornet was competent enough to
offer opinion evidence in this case with regard to the applicable
standard of care.3 19 The court found based on the importance of
proving breach of a particular standard of care to prevail in a
Tennessee medical malpractice claim, the district court did not err
in determining Dr. Gornet had no personal knowledge of the
standard of care in Nashville nor in a similar community. 320 The
court found the medical standard of care varied between states, the
law to be applied is the law of that state, and Dr. Gornet admitted he
did not "know any of the characteristics of the Nashville medical
community. ' 32 Thus, the court held the district court did not abuse
its discretion in entering judgment against patient because patient
could not prove his claims against defendant without proper
medical opinion testimony. 322 Sommer v. Davis et al., No. 01-5761,
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1457 (6th Cir. Jan. 30, 2003).
312 Sommer v. Davis et al., No. 01-5761,2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1457, at
*14 (6th Cir. Jan. 30, 2003).
313 Id. at *2.
314 Id. at *2-3.
315 Id. at *3.
316 Id. at *4-5.
317 Sommer, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS at *6.
318 /d.
311 Id. at * I.
320 ld. at *15-16.
32_ Id. at *20-21.
322 Sommer, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS at *22-24.
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In Order to Add Another Physician as Joint Tortfeasor,
Defendant Must Prove Fault By Establishing the Other
Physician Acted Below Medical Standard of Care.
The Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District,
Division Two, held the trial court did not err in denying defendant's
motion to include Dr. Metros as a joint tortfeasor in a medical
malpractice judgment.323
Plaintiff was treated by defendant for bunions on her feet.32 4 In
July 1998, defendant performed a bunionectomy on plaintiffs' right
foot which caused plaintiff a lot of pain. 325 In September 1998,
defendant performed a second corrective surgery which was
unsuccessful.326  After plaintiff suffered pain and an infection,
defendant performed a third surgery. 327 Following this surgery,
plaintiff was admitted into the hospital for osteomyelitis, an
infection of the bone and soft tissue.328 After the fourth surgery, the
toe was deformed, shorter and nonfunctional.329
Plaintiff next went to Dr. Metros, who performed three more
unsuccessful surgeries on her foot. 330 While Dr. Metros' efforts
weren't entirely successful, they did succeed in improving the
toe. 331 Plaintiff subsequently filed a medical malpractice claim
against defendant. 332  Defendant appeals a medical malpractice
judgment against her, claiming that Dr. Metros should be brought in
as a joint tortfeasor, thus reducing her liability for non-economic
damages.333 This court is asked to review whether proof of medical
malpractice was needed to add Dr. Metros to the special verdict as
an additional tortfeasor.
334
In order to add Dr. Metros as a joint tortfeasor, defendant must
establish fault within the meaning of Civil Code Section 1431.2 .
When determining a defendant's share of fault, the court may
consider the other joint tortfeasors' degree of fault and therefore
323 Deborah Wilson v. Sharlene M. Ritto, No. 030818, 2003 Cal. App.
LEXIS 43 (Jan. 14, 2003) at ***1.
324 Id.
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 ld.
328 Wilson, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 43 at ***2.
329 Id.
330 m.
331 id.
332 Id.
333 Wilson,, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 43 at ***2.
334 Id.
335 Id. at ***3.
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minimize the defendant's portion,.336 However, there can be no
apportionment of fault unless there is substantial evidence that an
individual is at fault, which is lacking in this case. 337 Although
defendant argues that all that is needed to establish fault is a
showing of contribution, the court disagrees. 338 Fault implies
wrongdoing or blameworthiness which is measured by the standard
of care in the medical community. 339S0 in order to prove fault,
defendant must show the doctor violated medical standard of care
under California Civil Code § 1431.2.340 This was not proven here.
Fault or wrongdoing in the context of medical malpractice is
measured by the standard of care in the medical community.
341
Mere error of judgment is not enough to establish a doctor's fault
according to the medical standard of care. 342
Applying the medical malpractice burden of proof, the court
held defendant did not establish Dr. Metros was a joint tortfeasor. 343
defendant's expert witness only testified Dr. Metros did not use
spacers to stretch the tissue, but there is no proof that this practice
falls below standard medical care. 344 Therefore, the trial court was
correct in denying defendant's motion to add Dr. Metros as a joint
tortfeasor, and the judgment was affirmed. 4 5 Deborah Wilson v.
Sharlene M. Rito, No. E030818, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 43 (Jan. 14,
2003).
MEDICARE/MEDICAID
Non-Parent Caregivers are Entitled to Receive Similar
Medicaid Benefits as Parent Caregivers
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that
the Michigan Medicaid plan's methodology for calculating benefits
for parents and non-parents of dependent children violates federal
Medicaid law and regulations. 346 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the
336 Id.
"I I(/. at *.I.
338 Wilson 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 43 at ***4.
339 Id. ***4.
340 id. at ***4.
341 Id. at ***l.
341 ICd. at * * *1.
343 Wilson 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 43 at ***5.
344 Id.
345 Id.
346 Richard Markva, et al v. James K. Haveman, Jr., et al, No. 012509, 2003
U.S. App. LEXIS 1225 at **I (6th Cir. Jan. 27, 2003).
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District Court's ruling permanently enjoining the defendant's from
using the distinguishing methodology.
347
The plaintiffs are grandparents who are raising one or more of
their grandchildren because their grandchildren's parents are unable
to care for them.348 These grandparents are considered medically
needy, which means that their incomes are too high for welfare
programs, yet they qualify for Medicaid because their incomes do
not cover their medical needs.349 Thus, if the applicant's income
exceeds the minimum, Medicaid benefits are not awarded unless
certain out of pocket expenses for medical care exist.350  This
"spend down" is the difference between the applicant's countable
income and the minimum protected income. 35 1 It is here where the
statute makes a distinction between a "caretaker relative" and a
parent caretaker and other family members. 352 If a parent caretaker
applies for "caretaker relative" Medicaid, Michigan reduces the
parent's income by the amount needed to care for the children.
353
This proration does not apply to the relatives who are not biological
or adoptive parents of the children. 354 Thus, the "caretaker
relative" parent is entitled to the greater benefits than otherwise
similarly situated relatives who are not biologically related to the
children. 355  The district court agreed with plaintiffs that the
distinction violated the federal Medicaid law.
356
The Court of Appeals reviewed the case de novo to see if the
district court erred in granting plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment that no material fact existed as to whether the Medicaid
law was violated.357 In examining the statute, the court looked to
the methodology used in determining eligibility for assistance under
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program
("AFDC").358 Before this program was superceded by the Social
Security Act, the AFDC program's methodology for granting
benefits to the caretaker treated parents and non-parents equally. 359
347 Id at *4.
348 Id.
349 Id. at **5.
350 Id. at **6.
351 Markva, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1225 at **7.
352 Id.
353 ld.
354 Id.
355 Id. at **8.
356 Markva, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1225 at **9.
357 Id. at **7.
358 Id. at **13.
359 1d. at **14.
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The court found no relevant basis to justify this distinction in the
medically needy "caretaker relative" group. 360  Thus, the court
agreed with the district court that the current methodology used by
the Michigan statute was more restrictive than the AFDC
methodology.
36 1
The court also rejects the "anti-deeming" argument, where
Michigan argues that the "anti-deeming" statute precludes them
from treating parents and non-parents equally. 362 The anti-deeming
rule means that when a state calculates a dependent child's
eligibility for Medicaid, the state is not allowed to take into
consideration non-parent caretaker's responsibility for children.
363
The state argues that since the state is not allowed to assume non-
parent caretaker contribution for determining a child's benefits, the
state is also precluded from using this criteria when calculating the
364non-parent's eligibility for Medicaid. The court agreed with the
district court that although this methodology could be seen as
reasonable, it still did not comply with Congress' requirements.
365
Finally, the court concluded that the district court was correct in
determining that Michigan's policy violated the regulation which
provides that similarly situated caretaker relatives should get equal
"amounts, duration, and scope" of Medicaid coverage. 366 Also, the
court rejected the state's argument that the plaintiffs lacked
standing. 367 Richard Markva, et al v. James K. Haveman, Jr., et al,
No. 012509, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1225 (6th Cir. Jan. 27, 2003).
The Term "Medicare Eligible Expenses" Is Not Ambiguous For
Purposes of Determining Terms of Insurance Contract in
Breach of Contract / Promissory Estoppel Claim
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held the
district court was correct in granting summary judgment to
defendant insurance company on a claim of breach of contract and
promissory estoppel by plaintiff health care facility.3 68  Plaintiff
alleged that defendant breached its contract when it made only
360 Id. at -* 17.
361 Markva, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1225 at **17.
362 Id. at *'18.
363 Id. at **20.
364 Id. at **21.
365 i. at **25.
366 Markva, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1225 at **26.
367 Id. at **29.
368 Vencor v. Standard Life and Accident Ins. Co., No. 015435, 2003 U.S.
App. LEXIS 835, **3 (6th Cir. Jan 21, 2003).
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partial payment on a bill based on Medicare's per diem rates, not its
standard rates, which it alleged was the correct rate of calculating
CoStS. 3 6 9 When interpreting the contract for the term "Medicare
eligible expenses," the court held the term was not ambiguous and it
clearly referred to Medicare per diem rates.
370
Vencor, a long-term health facility, submitted a bill to Standard
Life and Accident Insurance Company ("Standard Life") for
services rendered to two patients. 371 However, Standard Life only
made partial payments of the bills, basing their calculation of the
cost on the per diem rate set by Medicare. 372 Vencor claimed the
rate should be based on their standard rates, citing the language in
the insurance policy and interpreting the meaning of the term
"Medicare eligible expenses" as all reasonable and necessary care
provided.373
The issue before the court was whether the language in the
insurance policy was ambiguous regarding payment based on the
rate set by Medicare. 374 This involved interpretation of the term
"Medicare eligible expenses" as described in the insurance
policy.375 The court, looking at the contract as a whole, examining
each word separately, and citing numerous cases that support their
holding, held the term was not ambiguous and clearly referred to the
Medicare per diem rate. 376  The court also held Vencor did not
have a claim under promissory estoppel, finding no promise that
Standard Life would pay the alleged expenses and no detrimental
reliance, since reliance by Vencor on the Outline of Coverage, and
not the actual insurance contract, was misguided.377  The court
affirmed the district court's finding of summary judgment for the
defendant. 378 Vencor v. Standard Life and Accident Ins. Co., No.
015435, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 835 (6th Cir. Jan 21, 2003).
369 Id. at **2.
370 Id. at **3 1.
371 Id. at **9.
372 Id. at **9.
"' Standard Life, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 835 at *'10-16.
374 Id. at ** 11.
171 Id. at * 15-16.376 Id. at *16-*31.
371 Id. at **31-36.
371 Standard Life, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 835 at **37.
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The Secretary of Health Services Cannot Routinely or
Arbitrarily Deny a Skilled Nursing Facility's (SNF's) Request
For an Upward Adjustment From the Routine Cost Limit
Applicable to Hospital-Based SNF's.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held the
district court was correct in granting summary in favor of plaintiff
concerning reimbursements for the "reasonable costs" of covered
services that they provide to Medicare beneficiaries.
37 9
Plaintiff St. Luke's Hospital requested an upward adjustment
from the routine cost limit applicable to hospital-based skilled
nursing facilities ("SNFs"). 380 By statute, the federal government
reimburses SNFs for the "reasonable cost" of covered services that
they provide to Medicare beneficiaries. 381  In 1984, Congress
changed the formula for calculating the "reasonable cost limit"
("RCL") for free-standing SNFs. 382 It provides that the Secretary
"may make adjustments" in the cost limits for any SNF to the extent
that the Secretary "deems appropriate, based upon case mix or
circumstances" beyond the facility's control.383
St. Luke's sought reimbursement under which the SecretaryS ,3 8 4
may grant an upward adjustment for "atypical services." Any
upward adjustment may be made "only to the extent the costs are
reasonable, attributable to the circumstances specified, separately
identified by the provider, and verified by the intermediary. 85 The
court found that the Secretary, in his attempt to justify the particular
section of the Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual, confused
two distinct concerns: reimbursement of SNFs for their typical costs
and reimbursement of an individual SNF for providing services
atypical of similarly classified providers. 386 The court concluded
that the section was likely to discourage efficient hospital-based
SNFs with typical costs below the routine cost limit from providing
atypical services to those who needed them because the SNFs
would not be reimbursed for those services.
387
371 St. Luke's Methodist Hospital v. Thompson, No. 01-3995, 2003 U.S.
App. LEXIS 427 (U.S. Jan 13, 2003).
380 Id. at **4.
3811 Id. at **2.
382 Id. at **3.
393 Id.
384 Thompson, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 427 at**4.
385 m.
386 Id. at **11.
31 id. at **13.
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The court agreed that the Secretary had discretion, but not to
the extent that was claimed. 388 Furthermore, the court explained
that it had seen no evidence to support the conclusion that section
2534.5 promoted efficiency or helped Medicare recipients receive
the care they need. 389 The court was convinced that the Secretary's
determination of denying hospital-based SNFs all costs expended
was therefore unreasonable and arbitrary.390 Therefore, the court
affirmed the district court grant of summary judgment to the
hospital.39' St. Luke's Methodist Hospital v. Thompson, No. 01-
3995, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 427 (U.S. Jan 13, 2003).
MENTAL HEALTH
Judicial Finding of a Psychiatric Patient's Capacity to Make
Decisions About Future Care and Treatment May Not Be
Constitutionally Required Prior to Temporary Detainment If
Private Interests, Governmental Interests, and Probability of
Error Do Not Mandate a Hearing
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Queens
County, held a psychiatric patient may be temporarily detained for
evaluation for 72 hours and was not constitutionally entitled to a
judicial hearing to determine his or her capacity to make further
decisions about treatment if, by clear and convincing evidence,
private and governmental interests do not mandate a hearing.
392
Dr. Martin, a hospital director of the Department of Psychiatry,
requested a court order to authorize a non-compliant psychiatric
patient be temporarily detained for a psychiatric evaluation to
determine whether the patient needed to receive assisted outpatient
treatment ("AOT").393 Plaintiff patient argued that participation in
AOT against her will violated constitutional rights of Due Process,
Equal Protection, and personal liberty.
394
The court addressed whether it violates personal rights
guaranteed by the Constitution for a doctor to temporarily retain a
non-compliant psychiatric patient for 72 hours for evaluation
without mandating a judicial hearing to determine the patient's
388 Id. at **10.
3'9 Thompson, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 427 at **13.
39 Id. at **14.
391 Id. at * 1.
392 In re Kwang L. (Anonymous), No. 2001-02263, 2003 N.Y. App. Div.
LEXIS 758, at *5, 6 (Feb. 23, 2003).
393 Id. at *2-3.
394 Id. at *4.
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capacity to make his or her own treatment decision. 395 The court
held a judicial finding of incapacity is not mandated if the court
determines a judicial hearing will not significantly reduce the
possibility of an incorrect removal decision and if party interests do
not require a hearing. 396 The court must weigh three factors to
determine whether a judicial hearing is mandated prior to
detainment: the private interest of the patient, the government's
interest and additional burdens of a mandated hearing, and the
probability that the patient will be wrongly deprived of his or her
interests by not mandating a pre-removal judicial hearing. 397
The court reasoned that requiring a judicial hearing may
burden the government, who has a strong interest in avoiding
lengthy hearings. 398 Also, mental health professionals should not be
required to divert their resources to defend their well-considered
decisions of retention of psychiatric patients in judicial hearings. 399
Moreover, patients have notice and hearing provisions available to
them for any involuntary detention beyond 72 hours which meet
due process standards. 40 The court also reasoned, by requiring a
clear and convincing standard of proof that a patient requires AOT,
a separate judicial finding of capacity is unnecessary.401
Plaintiffs appeal to reverse the court's order granting
respondent's petition to authorize AOT of plaintiff patient without a
pre-removal judicial hearing was denied. In re Kwang L.
(Anonymous), No. 2001-02263, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 758
(Feb. 3, 2003).
Fast Food Restaurant Has No Duty to Warn Consumers of
Unhealthy Attributes of Its Food Products If Reasonable
Consumers Know Or Should Know the Food Contains
Unhealthy Products.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York held a retail food outlet has a duty to warn consumers of
dangerous or unhealthy contents of its food products only if a
reasonable consumer would be unaware of these dangerous or
unhealthy characteristics of the food based on the ordinary
'9' Id. at *6.
396 Id. at *7.
397 In re Kwang L. (Anonymous), 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 758 at *6.
398 Id. at *7.
399 Id.
400 Id.
40 Id. at *6.
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knowledge of the community. 4°2 Also, the duty to warn extends to
latent dangers in the products which would result from foreseeable
uses of the products.40 3  A food retailer may be held liable for
negligence if the retailer failed to fulfill its duty to warn and if the
consumer can adequately prove that the dangerous characteristic of
the food sold by the specific retailer proximately caused unhealthy
damage, or addiction, or allergic sensitivity to the consumer.
404
Plaintiff minors consumed food at two McDonald's retail
outlets. 40 5 Thereafter, plaintiffs developed a number of adverse
medical conditions - obesity, diabetes, coronary heart disease, high
blood pressure, and other detrimental health conditions
Plaintiffs' parents filed a class action lawsuit against the two
individual McDonald's retail outlets, McDonald's of New York
who does business with McDonald's retail outlets in the state, and
McDonald's Corporation who does business with McDonald's
outlets worldwide.4 °v All activities, including advertising, product
ingredients, and promotions of individual McDonald's retail outlets
are authorized by McDonald's Corporation and McDonald's of
408New York. McDonald's Corporation ensures the quality and
substance of products sold at individual outlets are "substantially
-409identical." McDonald's Corporation has an exemption, as a
restaurant, from the Federal Nutritional Labeling and Education
Act, which requires that specific nutritional qualities of retailed
food be marked on all packages.410
Medical studies show that obesity is associated with a higher
risk of developing preventable diseases, such as diabetes and
coronary heart disease. 4 11 McDonald's food products generally
contain high amounts of cholesterol, fat, salt, and sugar.41 2
Excessive consumption of foods high in cholesterol, fat, salt, and
sugar may lead to obesity and adverse health conditions.413
402 Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., No. 02-7821, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 707,
at **48-49 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2003).
403 Id. at **73-74.
404 Id. at **72-73.
411 Id. at ** 10- 11 .
406 H. at **11.
407 Pelinan, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 707 at **1 1, 14.
408 1. at **12.
409 Id.
410 Id. at **30.
411 Id. at **13-14.
412 Pelnan, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 707 at **52.
413 Id. at **53.
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The first issue the court addressed was whether McDonald's
acted negligently by failing to warn consumers of dangerous and
unhealthy ingredients of its products, selling dangerous products to
consumers, and advertising and promoting products but failing to
warn of dangerous or unhealthy characteristics of the products.
414
The court held McDonald's duty to warn consumers only exists if
the danger of the product is outside the knowledge and expectations
of a reasonable consumer. 415 The court reasoned that the nutritional
information of McDonald's food products was available online to
416
consumers and upon consumer request.. The court additionally
held advertising is only negligent where advertisements or
promotions explicitly assert misleading product information.
417
Moreover, the court reasoned fast food, including McDonald's
food products, is well-known to consumers to possess high amounts
of cholesterol, fat, salt, and sugar which are generally unhealthy
characteristics of food. 4 18 Food products which would require a
warning include food composed of genetically modified ingredients
or food which is additionally processed so that its danger to
419consumer health would not be realized by a reasonable consumer.
Also, recovery for damages resulting from adverse medical
conditions require that the consumer show, with "sufficient
specificity," the food product proximately caused the damage.420
Defendants' motion to dismiss all complaints was granted.42'
Plaintiffs' motion to remand complaints to state court was denied,
while plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend the complaints was
granted.422 Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., No. 02- 7821, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 707 (S.D.N. Y Jan. 22, 2003).
Physician Was Negligent Where No Blood Tests Were Not
Ordered in a Timely Fashion and Patient Suffered from
Hypertension.
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana held that trial court did not
clearly commit error where it held that defendant, physician, was
414 Id. at **15.
415 Id. at **51.
416 Pelman, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 707 at **45.
417 Id. at **37.
418 Id. at **52.
419 Id. at **61.
420 Id. at **73.
4• Pelmian, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 707 at **82.
,2, Id. at **25, 82.
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negligent in treating plaintiff, Costa, in not ordering baseline blood
tests when the patient had a history of hypertension. 423
Defendant first treated the plaintiff, Costa, on June 15, 1993 .424
On this date, defendant took plaintiffs history and performed a
physical examination.425  Plaintiff informed defendant that she
suffered from hypertension and took medicine to treat it.
426
Defendant did not order any lab work at this time.427 Over the next
15 months, plaintiff visited defendant sixteen times for symptoms
such as: headaches, stomach cramps, knee pains, high blood
pressure, congestion in the lungs, coughing, a pain between her
shoulders, nausea, vomiting, shakiness, swollen face, matting eyes,
weight loss, and fatigue.4 28  On November 21, 1994, defendant
ordered a lab work-up on plaintiff.429 The next day, defendant
informed plaintiff that she needed to go to the hospital. 430 Due to a
lack of insurance and at the advice of defendant, plaintiff went to
LSU Medical Center. 43 1 At LSU Medical Center, plaintiff was
diagnosed with chronic renal failure and it was discovered that her
432kidneys had shrunken to one-half their normal size.. Plaintiff
remained on dialysis until she died on April 1, 1999. 433 Plaintiff
petitioned to impanel a Medical Review Panel alleging that she had
suffered acute renal failure due to defendant's negligence. 434 The
Medical Review Panel opined that defendant failed to meet the
applicable standard of care, but this failure was not a contributing
factor in the eventual outcome of this case.435  Subsequently,
plaintiff filed suit against defendant.436 Defendant pled plaintiffs
own fault in failing to comply with treatment because she did not
want him to order lab tests due to her financial condition and lack of
insurance. 437 The trial court held that defendant failed to meet the
standard of care and the evidence established that even though
423 Costa v. Boyd, No. 36-584-CA, 2003 La. App. LEXIS *141, 1 (LA App.
Jan. 3 1, 2003).
424 Id.
425 d.
426 Id.
427 Id. at *2.
428 Costa, 2003 La. App. LEXIS 141 at *6.
429 Id. at *5.
43 Id. at *6.
431 Id.
432 Id.
431 Costa, 2003 La. App. LEXIS 141, at *7.
434 Id.
435 Id. at *7-8.
436 Id. at *8.
437 Id. at *8, 13.
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plaintiff may have suffered renal failure sooner or later, her
condition worsened faster due to defendant's negligence. 438 The
trial court awarded $30,000 in general damages and $6,150 in
special damages representing the medical expenses incurred during
her stay at LSU Medical Center.439 Defendant appealed the trial
court's judgment. 440
The first issue addressed by the court was whether the trial
court was clearly wrong in finding that defendant breached the
applicable standard of care. The court held that defendant clearly
breached the applicable standard of care. 44 1 Furthermore, the court
held that if defendant believed plaintiff could only afford
incomplete treatment, then he should have refused treatment when
she first voiced concerns about spending money on lab work.44 2
The second issue is whether the trial court erred in finding that
defendant's conduct caused damages to plaintiff.443 The court held
that the trial court was not clearly wrong in assessing damages
against defendant in this matter.44 4 The court also held that it is
gross speculation to suggest that if plaintiff had started dialysis
earlier, then the aforementioned pain and suffering would have
simply been displaced by the discomfort of dialysis.44
The third issue was whether the trial court erred in awarding
$6,150 in medical expenses incurred by plaintiff at LSU Medical
Center. 446  The court held that only $1,665 was incurred due to
defendant's negligence. 447  Therefore, the trial court abused its
448discretion in awarding any additional medical expenses.
Consequently, the award of special damages was reduced to $1,665
and affirmed.4 49
The final issue was whether the trial court erred in not reducing
defendant's fault due to the noncompliance of plaintiff and the
negligence of the first physician to treat her hypertension. 45 0 The
court held that because plaintiff's first physician last examined
... Costa, 2003 La. App. LEXIS 141 at *9.
49 Id. at *9- 10.
440 Id. at * 10.
441 Id. at *15.
442 Id.
143 Costa, 2003 La. App. LEXIS 141 at *15.
444 Id. at *25.
445 Id.
446 Id.
44 Id. at *28-29.
... Costa, 2003 La. App. LEXIS 141 at 29.
449 Id.
450 id.
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plaintiff nearly two years before she suffered damages, his failure to
order lab tests was too attenuated from plaintiffs damages to find
causation. 451 The court also held that the trial court was not clearly
wrong in assessing defendant with 100% of the fault for pain,
suffering and mental anguish experienced by plaintiff due to
defendant's failure to order baseline blood tests.452 The decision of
the trial court was affirmed. 453  Costa v. Boyd, No. 36-584-CA,
2003 La. App. LEXIS *141, 1 (LA App. Jan. 31, 2003)
PROVING MALICE
Plaintiffs Must Meet Three Requirements for Malice When
Suing a Hospital for Malicious Credentialing of Physicians.
The Fourteenth Circuit Court of Appeals of Texas found evidence
was legally and factually insufficient to justify a jury finding of
malice against a hospital. 4 Thus, the court reversed the jury
decision and reversed the awarding of damages because they were
based on this finding of malice.
455
Plaintiff Ricardo Romero suffered severe neurological injuries
following a back surgery performed by Dr. Baker. 456  This
procedure was performed at the Columbia Kingwood Medical
Center ("Hospital").457 During the surgery, Mr. Romero suffered
extreme blood loss, went into cardiac arrest, but was resuscitated. 458
Stemming from this event, Mr. Romero suffered brain damage that
left him disabled. In order for Dr. Baker to use the Hospital's
facilities, he had to go through the credentialing process. 460 This
consists of completing a questionnaire and providing peer
recommendations. Once the doctor provides this information, the
Hospital verifies the information, reviews licenses, and contacts the
state and federal agencies. 46 1 Then, the chairman of the surgery
451 Id. at *36.
452 Id. at *38-39.
453 Costa, 2003 La. App. LEXIS 141 at 29.
454 KPH Consolidation, Inc. d/b/a Columbia Kingwood Medical Center v.
Dolores Romero, et al, No. 14-00-01177-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 128 at *6
(Tex. App. January 9, 2003).
455 id.
456 Id. at * 1.
417 Id. at *4.
451 Id. at *3.
4'9 KPH Consolidation, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 128 at *3.
460 Id. at *4.
46 Id.
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department reviews the collected information and then gives his
462recommendation to the Medical Executive Committee. After the
Medical Executive Committee reviews the doctor's credentials, the
Board of Trustees has the final say in granting the credentials.
463
Following this process, the Hospital granted Dr. Baker provisional
status access to the Hospital, which eventually was upgraded to
active staff privileges.4 64 After Mr. Romero's botched procedure,
Dr. Baker's privileges were suspended, and he did not reapply for
privileges the following year. 465 Plaintiffs sued the Hospital where
the surgery was performed because they claimed the Hospital acted
maliciously in granting Dr. Baker credentials. 466 They asserted the
Hospital was aware that Dr. Baker abused prescription drugs and
was also an incompetent surgeon.
467
To establish their malicious credentialing claim, plaintiffs must
show proof of malice. 468 The definition of malice contains two
469parts, objective and subjective. To satisfy the objective test, the
defendant's conduct must involve an extreme risk of harm, which is
considerably higher than the objective test for negligence. 47 Then,
subjectively, the defendant must have actual awareness of the risk
created by the conduct.471 After establishing this framework, the
court analyzed the evidence presented by plaintiffs. Due to the
Hospital's right to invoke privacy privilege in regards to
credentialing process, plaintiffs were not able to examine what the
Hospital actually knew about Dr. Baker. 472 They were left to
present circumstantial evidence of risk, that by inference, the
Hospital had to know about. 47
To satisfy the objective test of "extreme risk of harm," the
plaintiffs relied on evidence of Dr. Baker's drug abuse and
professional incompetence, and peer evaluations of Dr. Baker.
474
The court believed plaintiffs' evidence of drug abuse was legally
and factually sufficient to satisfy the objective test.475 Plaintiffs'
462 Id.
463 Id.
464 KPH Consolidation, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 128 at *5.
465 Id. at *6.
466 Id. at *2.
467 Id. at *2.
4"8 Id. at *7.
469 KPH Consolidation, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 128 at *8.
470 Id. at *9.
471 Id.
472 Id. at * 16.
473 Id. at * 18.
474 KPH Consolidation, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 128 at *20.
475 Id. at *30.
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called an expert witness to testify to the potential threat of a
476physician who abuses drugs. They also called Dr. Baker's ex-
wife who testified to his behavior prior to Mr. Romero's surgery.477
She believed his erratic behavior was due to his abuse of Vicotin.47
The court saw this evidence as sufficient to justify a jury finding of
an extreme risk of harm. 47 9  However, plaintiffs' evidence of
professional incompetence and peer evaluations was not
sufficient. 48  Nevertheless, plaintiffs' evidence of drug abuse was
enough to satisfy the first prong of the malice test.48'
To prove subjective awareness, the plaintiffs employed the
same evidence presented for satisfying the objective test. 41' They
argue that the Hospital became aware of Dr. Baker's drug abuse
483during the credentialing process.. This argument was supported
by the testimony of Dr. Baker's ex-wife, who testified the Hospital
was aware of Dr. Baker's drug abuse.484  Also, Dr. Baker was
investigated by the State Board of Medical Examiners for drug
abuse and excessive lawsuits. 485 The Hospital was aware of this
investigation, and postponed its credentialing process of Dr. Baker
until the investigation was over. 4 8 6  The court found that this
evidence proved the Hospital had actual, subjective awareness that
Dr. Baker's drug use posed an extreme risk to patients.48 7 Next, the
court examined the final requirement, conscious indifference. 488
Plaintiffs' evidence of conscious indifference included the
following: the Hospital's decision to credential Dr. Baker, despite
its awareness of his drug abuse, the Hospital's allowance for Dr.
Baker to continue performing surgery following Mr. Romero, and489
expert testimony. After reviewing this evidence, the court found
that plaintiffs did not prove conscious indifference. 490  Although
there was evidence to find the Hospital was subjectively aware of
the extreme risk, as the Hospital invoked its confidentiality
476 Id. at *20.
477 Id. at *21.
478 Id. at *22.
479 KPH Consolidation, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 128 at *32.
480 Id. at * 18.
481 id. at *32.
482 Id. at *34.
483 Id. at *35.
484 KPH Consolidation, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 128 at *36.485 Id.
486 Id. at *37.
487 Id at *38.
488 Id.
489 KPH Consolidation, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 128 at *38.
490 Id. at *39.
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privilege, the court could not determine what the Hospital did in
response to the information it had regarding the surgeon's drug
abuse. 491 Thus, there was no evidence that the Hospital acted with
conscience indifference in not suspending the surgeon prior to the
patient's surgery.492 Thus, plaintiffs failed to meet their burden and
the court reversed the jury verdict and damages against the Hospital.
KPH Consolidation, Inc. d/b/a Columbia Kingwood Medical Center
v. Dolores Romero, et al, No. 14-00-01177-CV, 2003 Tex. App.
LEXIS 128 (Tex. App. January 9, 2003).
RIGHT TO TREATMENT
A Jury May Weigh the Absence of Adverse Medical Effects In
Assessing the Objective Sufficiency of Prisoner's Eighth
Amendment Claim
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held the
United States District Court for the Northern District of New York
was correct in denying prisoner's motion for a new trial on his
Eighth Amendment denial of medical care claim after a jury found
that the prisoner had not established that he suffered from a "serious
medical need. '493  The court held that evidence regarding the
absence of actual medical injury may be considered as a relevant
factor in assessing whether an alleged denial of medical care is
sufficiently serious to establish a claim under the Eighth
Amendment.
494
Prisoner Willie Smith contended that defendant prison officials
acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs
because the prison officials failed to provide him with his daily HIV
medication on two occasions while he was incarcerated at Camp
Pharsalia. 495 The prisoner maintained that the first episode occurred
due to a delay in refilling Smith's prescriptions after his existing
medication ran out, resulting in seven days of scheduled doses.4 96
The prisoner missed another five days of scheduled doses due to a
random search of his living quarters.497
491 Id. at *39.
492 Id.
493 Smith v. Nurse Carpenter et a]., No. 01-0294, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
503 (2d Cir. Jan. 14, 2003).
494 Id. at **2.
495 Id. at **3.
4,90 Id. at **4.
97 Id.
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The prisoner explained to the district court the importance of
maintaining strict compliance with his drug regimen in order to
prevent the deterioration of his immune system and the proliferation
of his HIV infection. 498 Although defendant prison officials
recognized the importance for HIV patients to follow a regular drug
regimen, they contended that the alleged episodes of missed
medication did not subject the prisoner to a serious risk of harm. 4 9 9
To buttress the argument, the prison officials presented a medical
expert who testified that the prisoner's reported symptoms of
itching and headaches were likely side effects of the medications
themselves and would not have been caused by the lack of
medication. 5
0 0
The court reviewed the district court's decision to deny the
prisoner's motion for new trial for abuse of discretion. 50 1 "In order
to establish an Eighth Amendment claim arising out of inadequate
medical care, a prisoner must prove 'deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs."' 50 2 The prisoner argued that HIV was a
serious medical need, and the district court improperly allowed the
jury to consider evidence regarding the absence of actual medical
injury in determining that the prisoner had no serious medical
need.50 3 The court, however, concluded that the prisoner's claim
was based solely on short-term interruptions in his otherwise
adequate HIV treatment, and the district court correctly focused on
the risks attributable to the missed medication. 50 4 Consequently, the
court affirmed in holding that the jury was entitled to consider the
prisoner's lack of any adverse medical effects from the missed
medication in finding that the prisoner's medical need lacked the
severity necessary to constitute a constitutional violation.50 5 Smith
v. Nurse Carpenter et al., No. 01-0294, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 503
(2d Cir. Jan. 14, 2003).
... Smith, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 503 at **5.
49) Id. at **6.
500 Id.
501 Id. at "10.
2d. at** II (citing Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir.
1998)).
503 Smith, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 503 at **16.
504 Id. at ** 19-21.
505 d. at **22.
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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Despite Evidence of Concealment, Patient Did Not Timely Bring
the Action Because She Experienced, Almost Immediately After
the Surgery, Symptoms That Should Have Led to the Discovery
of the Removal of the Skin Tags
The Court of Appeals of Indiana for the Third District held the
circuit court was incorrect in denying the physician's motion for
summary judgment on the ground that there was an issue of fact as
to whether the physician had fraudulently concealed a certain
surgery he performed on plaintiff.50 6 The court held the circuit
court was correct in granting the physician's motion for summary
judgment as to the patient's allegation of negligence. 50 7
GYN-OB Consultants, L.L.C., and Stephen E. Coats, M.D.,
performed a hysterectomy on patient, Lynn C. Schopp. 50 8 Two
months before the hysterectomy was performed, the patient told the
physician that she had noticed some skin tags on her vagina and that
they itched. 50 9 Dismissing the tags as a health risk, the physician
advised that the skin tags appeared normal, and that he could
remove them that day in the office. 10 The patient declined.51
During the surgery, the physician removed the skin tags from her
vaginal area, without her consent. 5 1 One month later, the patient
scheduled an appointment with the physician because the
appearance of her clitoris had changed. s13  Subsequently, she
complained to the physician that she was experiencing swelling and
discomfort in her vagina.51 4 There, the physician told her that he
had removed the skin tags at the time of the hysterectomy; however,
he told her there was no connection to between their removal and
her symptoms, and that he had not operated near her clitoris.51 5
Two years later, after requesting a surgical report, she learned the
physician had performed surgery near her clitoris.51
6
506 GYN-OB Consultants, L.L.C. v. Schopp, 780, 15 N.E.2d 1206 (2003).
507 Id. at 16.
50 Id. at 2.
50) /d.
5 1
0 Id. at 3.
511 Schopp, 780 N.E.2d. at 3.
512 Id.
"' Id. at 4.
514 Id.
51 Id. at 4.
511 Schopp, 780 N.E.2d. at 4.
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The court reviewed the facts of the case to determine whether
the lower court was correct in denying the physician's motion for
summary judgment based on the assertion that the patient's claim of
active and constructive concealment is barred by the statute of
limitations, and whether the lower court was correct in granting the
physician summary judgment on the issue of the physician's
negligence in the manner of performing the surgery.51 7 A medical
malpractice claim must generally be brought within two years of the
alleged act, omission, or neglect. 51 8  The court concluded that
despite evidence of concealment, the patient did not timely bring the
action because she discovered, less than two months after the
surgery, that the skin tags had been removed without her consent,
and later, that she had symptoms relating to the problem area.
5 19
The court concluded that the action was barred by the statute of
limitations because the medical malpractice statute of limitations is
tolled until the patient experiences symptoms that would cause a
person of reasonable diligence to take action that would lead to the
discovery of the malpractice. 52  As for the patient's negligence
claim, the court concluded that the patient failed to offer evidence to
rebut the physician's proof that he exercised the requisite standard
of care in performing the removal of the skin tags near the patient's
clitoris.52' The patient offered a deposition of a physician of the
medical review panel, but the court concluded that the deposition
addressed only the issue of the patient's consent, not the physician's
alleged negligence. 522 Thus, the physician's grant of summary
judgment by the trial court was affirmed. GYN-OB Consultants,
L.L.C. v. Schopp, 780 N.E.2d 1206 (2003).
57 Id. at 6.
518 Id. at 7.
519 id.
520 Id. at 13.
521 Schopp, 780 N.E.2d. at 13.
522 Id. at 15.
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